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Abstract—In Financial Cryptography 2013, Bringer, Chabanne
and Patey proposed two cryptographic protocols for the com-
putation of Hamming distance in the two-party setting. Their
first scheme uses Oblivious Transfer and provides security in the
semi-honest model. The other scheme uses Committed Oblivious
Transfer (COT) and is claimed to provide full security in the
malicious case. The proposed protocols have direct implications to
biometric authentication schemes between a prover and a verifier
where the verifier has biometric data of the users in plain form.
In this paper, we show that their protocol against malicious
adversaries is not actually secure. Namely, we show a generic
attack such that a malicious user can compute a Hamming
distance which is different from the actual value. For biometric
authentication systems, this attack allows a malicious adversary
to pass the authentication without knowledge of the honest user’s
input with at most O(n) complexity instead of O(2n), where n
is the input length. We propose an enhanced version of their
protocol where this attack is eliminated. The security of our mod-
ified protocol is proved using simulation-based paradigm. Also as
for efficiency concerns, the modified protocol utilizes Verifiable
Oblivious Transfer (VOT) which excludes the commitments to
outputs (as they exist in COT). We show that the use of VOT
does not reduce the security of the protocol but improves the
efficiency significantly.
Index Terms—Biometric Identification, Authentication, Ham-
ming distance, Privacy, Committed Oblivious Transfer.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several commercial organizations have invested
in secure electronic authentication systems to reliably verify
identity of individuals. Biometric authentication mechanisms
is one of the wide-spread popular technology because of the
cost-effective improvements in sensor technologies and in the
efficiency of matching algorithms [1]. The biometric data (i.e.
templates) of a user is inherently unique. This uniqueness
provides the reliability of the individual to be securely authen-
ticated for accessing to an environment when the biometric
data is kept as secret. The biometric data cannot be directly
used with conventional encryption techniques because these
data are inherently noisy [2]. Namely, whenever two sample
of data extracted from the same fingerprint, these data would
not be exactly same. In this context, in order to eliminate noisy
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nature of the biometric templates, several error correction
techniques have been proposed in the literature [3], [4], [5].
Biometric authentication over insecure network raises more
security and privacy issues. The primary security issue is the
protection of the plain biometric templates against malicious
adversary because they cannot be replaced with a new one,
once they are compromised. The common biometric authen-
tication system is as follows. For each user, the biometric
template is stored in a database during the enrollment phase.
In the verification phase, a new fresh acquisition of a user
is compared to the template of the same individual stored
in the database. The verification phase can either be pro-
cessed within the smart card (i.e, on-card matching), or in
a system outside the card (i.e, off-card matching) [6]. Since
the biometric template is not necessarily transferred to the
outside environment, the on-card matching technique protects
the template. In both techniques, the authentication protocol
should not expose the biometric template without the user’s
agreement. In order to ensure privacy of the user, the biometric
template should be stored in an encrypted form in the database
and no one including the server side can learn any information
on link between the user and her biometric data. But still, it
should be possible to verify whether a user is authentic [7].
In order to thwart, the security and privacy issue described
above for the biometric authentication, several matching algo-
rithms are proposed in the literature. Many of them utilize
the computation of the Hamming distance of two binary
biometric templates. Note that the Hamming distance does
not reveal any significant information to any polynomially
bounded adversary. In this context, in Financial Cryptography
2013, Bringer et al. [8] have proposed two secure Hamming
distance computation schemes based on Oblivious Transfer. In
their proposals, the authors integrate the advantages of both
biometrics and cryptography in order to improve the overall
security and privacy of an authentication system. The first
scheme is solely based on 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT)
and it achieves full security in the semi-honest setting, and
one-sided security in the malicious setting. The second scheme
uses Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) and is claimed to
provide full security against malicious adversaries.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• In this paper, we first revisit the Hamming distance com-
putation protocol SHADE of Bringer et al. [8]. We show
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the full scheme has a severe weakness on computation of
Hamming distance. We show that this weakness allows
any malicious adversary to violate the completeness of
the protocol, i.e., a different value of Hamming distance
from the actual one.
The protocol flaw resides in the method used for val-
idation of the inputs of a user. Using zero-knowledge
proofs, the protocol forces the user to submit valid inputs,
i.e. pairs of integers (x, y) that differ by 1. The method
succeeds at checking the difference, however, it fails
at validation of the pairs, i.e. a malicious party can
submit invalid pairs (x − 2−1, x + 2−1). Since SHADE
computes the Hamming distance by summing each side
and evaluating the difference, a verifier would compute
an incorrect value. As a practical example for biometric
authentication, we show that a malicious adversary can
pass the authentication by running the algorithm at most
O(n) times (instead of running O(2n) times, where
n is the input length.). Last but least, an adversary
with knowledge of distribution of inputs can mount a
more powerful attack. Note that we believe this attack
is of independent interest and may be applied to other
schemes.
• In order to eliminate this severe weakness, we propose a
new method for input validation. This way, we remove
the fault in the protocol and enhance the security of it.
We also show that the computational complexity of the
fixed protocol is comparable with the insecure protocol.
Moreover, we optimize the new input validation method
for biometric authentication systems. We prove the secu-
rity of our protocol using ideal/real simulation paradigm
in the standard model [9], [10], [11] and [12].
• Lastly, we consider the efficiency of the protocol and
show that running a COT is not necessary in the second
option of the protocol. We show that VOT is sufficient
instead of using complete COT protocol which contains
additional commitments and zero-knowledge proofs [13].
This leads a considerable improvement in the computa-
tional complexity of the protocol.
B. Organization
Section 2 gives the related work on the computation of
Hamming distance and biometric authentication systems. Sec-
tion 3 provides the security and privacy model for biometric
authentication protocol. Section 4 reviews the two schemes in
the protocol, basic scheme which uses OTs and full scheme
based on COT of bit-strings. In Section 5, we present an attack
to the full scheme of Bringer et al. and show that their protocol
is insecure. In Section 6, we propose a security fix and discuss
the efficiency of their protocol in the malicious model. Here,
we show that VOT is sufficient instead of COT. In Section 7
we prove our fixed protocol using simulation-based paradigm.
The complexity analysis of the proposed protocol is shown in
Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
There has been a large amount of research done on the
security and efficiency of biometric authentication systems. In
this section, we review the most recent works for biometric
authentication.
Hamming distance together with Oblivious Transfers is one
of the most elegant tools used in biometric authentication
systems. For example, Jarrous and Pinkas propose binHDOT
protocol [14] to compute Hamming distance based on 1-out-
of-2 Committed Oblivious Transfer with Constant Difference
(COTCD) of Jarecki and Shmatikov [15] and Oblivious Poly-
nomial Evaluation (OPE) of Hazay and Lindell [16]. The
protocol also uses commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to
guarantee that each party follows the protocol. The protocol
provides full security in the malicious model. One OPE
protocol and n COTCDs are invoked to compute the Hamming
distance between two strings of n bits.
The SCiFI (Secure Computation of Face Recognition) of
Osadchy et al. is the first secure face identification sys-
tem which is well suited for real-life applications [17]. The
SCiFI system consist of two parts: a client and a server.
The server prepares face recognition database that contains
representations of face images. This computation is done
offline. In the verification phase, the client prepares her face
representation and then a cryptographic protocol which uses
Paillier encryption and Oblivious Transfer running between the
server and the client. The authors implemented a complete
SCiFI system in which a face is represented with a string
of 900 bits. The authors designed the system by aiming the
minimal online overhead: the most significant requirement
for computing Hamming distance between this length of bit
strings is 8 invocations of 1-out-of-2 OTs.
Bringer et al. [18] used biometric authentica-
tion/identification for access control. Note that it is important
to securely store the biometric template to the server.
Using conventional encryption schemes for securing the
biometric template can provide a strong protection. Note
that conventional cryptography requires exact match while
biometrics always have a threshold value, therefore biometric
authentication over the encrypted domain is a challenging
task. In this paper, a cryptographic scheme is given for
biometric identification over an encrypted domain which uses
Bloom Filters with Storage and Locality-Sensitive Hashing.
This paper is interesting since it proposes the first biometric
authentication/identification scheme over encrypted binary
templates which is stored in the server’s database.
In another paper, Bringer et al. [19] proposed a security
model for biometric-based authentication protocols, relying
the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [20]. This system allows
the biometric match to be performed in the encrypted domain
in such a way that the server cannot identify which user
is authenticating. The proposed system requires storage of
biometric templates in plain form. In order to protect the
privacy, the system ensures that the biometric feature stored
in the database cannot be explicitly linked to any identity, but
the DB only verifies whether the received data belongs to an
identity in the database.
3Erkin et al. [21] propose a privacy preserving face recog-
nition system on encrypted messages which is based on the
standard Eigenface recognition system [22]. In their protocol
design, they utilized semantically secure Paillier homomorphic
public-key encryption schemes and Damga˚rd, Geisler and
Krøigaard (DGK) cryptosystem [23], [24]. Later, Sadeghi et al.
make an improvement over the efficiency of this system [25].
In this study, they merge the eigenface recognition algorithm
using homomorphic encryption and Yao’s garbled circuits.
Their protocol improves the scheme proposed by Erkin et al.
significantly, i.e. it has only a constant number of O(1) rounds
and most of the computation and communication performed
during the pre-computation phase.
Tuyls et al. [26] propose a template protection scheme for
fingerprint based authentication in order to protect biometric
data. During the enrollment phase, Alice’s biometric features
X is extracted, the Helper Data [27] W is computed (that
is required by error-correction mechanism), a one-way hash
function H is applied to S and the data (Alice, W, H(S)) is
stored to the server. Here, S is a randomly chosen secret value
such that G(X, W)=S for a shielding function G [28]. During
the verification phase, after Alice’s noisy biometric data X is
extracted, the server sends W back to the sensor. The sensor
computes S = G(X ,W) and H(S). Then, the server compares
H(S) with H(S), and grants access if the results are equal. The
Helper Data is sent over the public channel, i.e. an adversary
may obtain W. Tuyls et al. however design the system in such
a way that the adversary obtains minimal information about X
by capturing W.
Kulkarni et al. [29] propose a biometric authentication
scheme based on Iris Matching. Their scheme uses the some-
what homomorphic encryption scheme of Boneh et al. [30]
which allows an arbitrary number of addition of ciphertexts
but supports only one multiplication operation between the
ciphertexts. The scheme is based on Paillier encryption and bi-
linear pairing. This scheme consists of two phases: Enrollment
phase and Verification phase. During the Enrollment phase,
first the necessary keys are generated by the server and sent
to the client securely. Secondly, the client’s biometric data
is XORed with the key, and a mask value is XORed with a
mask key. Both XORed values are sent to the server. During
the Verification (authentication) phase, the client sends an
encryption of an authenticated biometric data to compute the
distance. The protocol is proven to be secure in the semi-
honest model.
Kerschbaum et al. [31] propose an authentication scheme
in a different setting. Particularly, they assume that there are
two parties where each of them has a fingerprint template.
They would like to learn whether the templates match, i.e.
generated from the same fingerprint. However, they do not
want to reveal the templates if there is no match. Their protocol
uses secure multi-party computation which is secure only in
the semi-honest model.
Barni et al. propose a privacy preserving authentication
scheme for finger-code templates by using homomorphic en-
cryption which is secure only in the semi-honest model [32],
[33]. Their protocol allows the use of the Euclidean distances
to compare fingerprints in such a way that the biometric data
is reduced for computing a smaller encrypted value that is sent
to the server.
3. SECURITY AND PRIVACY MODEL
We adopt the standard simulation-based definition of
ideal/real security paradigm in the standard model which is
already highlighted in [9], [10], [11] and [12]. In simulation-
based security, the view of a protocol execution in a real set-
ting is compared (a statistical/computational indistinguishable
manner) as if the computation is executed in an ideal setting
where the parties send inputs to a trusted third party F that
performs the computation and returns its result.
In an ideal setting, the parties send their inputs x and y
to a trusted third party F who computes f(x, y) (which is
the output of the Hamming distance in our setting) and sends
f1(x, y) to the first party and f2(x, y) to the second party
(f1(x, y) and f2(x, y) can be ⊥ if only one party is required
to learn the output). Note that the adversary, who controls
one of the parties, can choose to send any input it wishes
to the trusted third party F , while the honest party always
sends its specified input. In a real execution of a protocol, one
of the parties is assumed to be corrupted under the complete
control of an adversary A. Note that we always assume that the
adversary A corrupts one of the two parties at the beginning of
the protocol execution and is fixed throughout the computation
(it is known as static adversary model).
Informally, a protocol is secure if for every real-model
adversary A interacting with an honest party running the
protocol, there exists an ideal-model adversary S interacting
with the trusted party computing f , such that the output
of the adversary and the honest party in the real model is
computationally indistinguishable from the output of simulator
and the honest party in the ideal model. More formally,
Definition 3.1. (Simulation-based security) Let f and the
protocol Π be as above. We say that the protocol Πf securely
computes the ideal functionality F if for any probabilistic
polynomial-time real-world adversary A, there exists a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time an ideal-model adversary S (called
the simulator) such that
REALΠF ,A(x, y)x,y s.t. |x|=|y| ≈ IDEALF,S(x, y)x,y s.t. |x|=|y|
Note that the above definition implies that the parties
already know the input lengths (by the requirement that |x|
= |y|).
Note that VOT and COT protocols are used as sub-protocols.
In [34], [35], it is shown that it is sufficient to analyze the
security of a protocol in a hybrid model in which the parties
interact with each other and assumed to have access to a
trusted third party that computes a VOT (resp. COT) protocol
for them. Thus, in the security analysis of our protocol the
simulator will play the role of the trusted third party for VOT
(resp. COT) functionality when simulating the corrupted party.
Roughly speaking, in the hybrid model, parties run an arbitrary
protocol like in the real model, but have access to a trusted
third party that computes a functionality (in our case VOT or
COT) like in the ideal model. A protocol is secure if any attack
on the real model can be carried out in the hybrid model.
44. THE BASIC AND THE FULL SCHEME OF BRINGER et al.
In this section, we briefly describe the basic and the full
scheme of [8] used for computation of Hamming distance
between two bit strings. The basic scheme uses oblivious
transfer (OT) and provides full security when the parties are
semi-honest and one-sided security in the malicious model.
The full scheme uses committed oblivious transfer (COT) [36]
and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [13] to compute the
Hamming distance in malicious model. Each scheme has two
options to select the party which computes and outputs the
result meaning that each party may act as a server and the
other as a client.
A. The Basic Scheme
The basic scheme is designed to provide secure and efficient
method for computing the Hamming distance between two bit
strings in semi-honest model. The intuition behind this proto-
col is that if both parties are semi-honest, the OT protocols
are sufficient to preserve privacy.
The basic scheme in [8] is roughly as follows:
Using the local notation, let P1 and P2 have the inputs
X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn} respectively. At
the first step, P1 randomly picks r1, . . . , rn ∈R Zn+1 and
computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the parties run
oblivious transfer in which P1 acts as the sender and P2 acts
as the receiver. More precisely, P1 inputs (ri + xi, ri + xi)
where xi = 1 − xi and P2 inputs yi. At the end of OT, P2
receives ti = (ri +xi) if yi = 0 and (ti = ri +xi) otherwise.
Next, P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti. In the last step,
• 1st Option: P2 sends T to P1.
P1 computes and outputs T −R.
• 2nd Option: P1 sends R to P2.
P2 computes and outputs T −R.
In the case of one party is malicious, the privacy of the
honest party is still provided because of the flexibility at the
end of the protocol.
Compared to the related protocols for secure computation of
Hamming distance in the semi honest model, the basic scheme
of Bringer et al. [8] is the most efficient protocol as they
proved in Section 6 of [8].
The authors also mention that the basic scheme can be
optimized by using the state of the art techniques, i.e. extended
oblivious transfer, as first proposed by Ishai et al. in [37] and
later improved in [38]. This technique leads to an efficient
construction which extends k OTs to n OTs (k < n) in the
random oracle model that is secure against only semi-honest
adversaries (note that hash functions can be replaced with RO
model in the real case).
B. The Full Scheme
The full scheme of Bringer et al. considers the case where
the parties are assumed to be malicious. Note that running OT
protocol does not prevent a party from modifying her input.
Secondly, the receiver may send a different value than the
actual OT output that she computes. In order to prevent such
scenarios, the authors propose to use the 1-out-of-2 Committed
Oblivious Transfer (COT) protocol of Kiraz et al. presented
in [36]. Though, in Section 5, we show that the idea of input
validation for P1 is not sufficient and can be exploited with
success.
Before we proceed, let’s continue with the description of
the full scheme.
At the first step of the protocol, P2 commits to her inputs
yi’s and proves that each yi is either 0 or 1. At the same
time, P1 generates random ri’s from the plaintext space of
the commitments scheme and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri but
this time she commits to (ai, bi) = (ri + xi, ri + xi).
Let’s denote Commit(M) for a commitment functionality of
a message M (note that Commit includes randomness and
we hide it for the sake of simplicity). P1 publishes the
commitments Ai = Commit(ai) and Bi = Commit(bi).
Note that Commit functionality is basically a (2,2)-threshold
homomorphic encryption which is used as a commitment
scheme (e.g., ElGamal [39], Paillier [40]). Furthermore, using
these commitments she proves that her inputs ai’s and bi’s
differ by 1. Next, the COT protocol is run for each i. At the
end of each COT, P2 receives ti = ri + (xi ⊕ yi) and both
parties receive Ci = Commit(ti) . When all the COTs are run,
P2 computes the sum T =
n∑
i=1
ti.
At this point, there are again two options:
• 1st Option: P2 computes C = Commit(T ) = C1 · . . . ·
Cn because of the underlying homomorphic property [8].
P2 sends T to P1 and proves that C commits to T. P1
computes C = C1 · . . . · Cn and checks the proof. If all
verifications are successful, P1 outputs T −R.
• 2nd Option: P1 computes K = Commit(2R + n) =
A1 · . . . ·An ·B1 · . . . ·Bn. P1 sends R to P2 and proves
that K commits to 2R + n. P2 computes K = A1 · . . . ·
An ·B1 · . . . ·Bn and checks that K = Commit(2R+n).
If all verifications are successful, P2 outputs T −R.
The authors in [8] claims that the above scheme is fully
secure against malicious parties. However, in the next section
we show that a malicious P1 can easily break the completeness
property of the scheme.
5. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF THE
BRINGER’S PROTOCOL et al.
We are now ready to describe the protocol flaw of the full
scheme in detail. The security flaw is due to the proof for
validation of P1’s input bits. The flaw allows a malicious P1
to change the Hamming distance between her input and P2’s
input. In the next section, we will propose a solution to fix the
flaw by designing a new proof for validation. We show that
the complexity of the new proof for the validation of P1’s
input bits for biometric authentication systems is significantly
reduced.
Furthermore, we also analyze the protocol from the ef-
ficiency perspective and show that the complexity of the
protocol can be significantly improved. COT protocol is basi-
cally designed as a sub-protocol in order to prevent possible
malicious behaviors between sender and receiver, where the
5committed output of COT is expected to be used in further
parts of the system. However, the committed outputs of COT
are not used in the case that P1 computes the Hamming
distance. Hence, we will point out that verifiable OT will be
sufficient in the case that P1 computes the Hamming distance.
This will eliminate to compute n commitments together with
the zero-knowledge proofs (for each run of COT protocol). In
this way, we will improve the efficiency of the protocol by
using VOT instead of COT when P1 is the server.
A. Attack to the Full Scheme
The protocol is insecure in the case where P1 is malicious.
This is because P1 is free in the sense that she can commit to
any pair such that the absolute value of the difference of the
encrypted values pairs is 1, i.e. P1 proves that |bi − ai| = 1
where the pair (ai, bi) is supposed to be (ri + xi, ri + xi).
However, a malicious P1 may choose invalid pairs in a special
way together with the proofs that difference between each pair
is equal to 1. Our attack uses the fact that at the end of each
COT, P2 receives either ti = ri + g or ti = ri + h and
computes the sum T =
n∑
i=1
ti, where g, h are within the finite
cyclic group. Note that g is expected to be equal to xi and h
to xi. However, with a careful choosing of g’s and h’s, some
g’s can be neutralized by some h’s in this sum. Hence, the
completeness property of the protocol can be violated.
Before we describe the attack we need to highlight that the
underlying COT scheme uses threshold ElGamal encryption as
a commitment mechanism, i.e. Commit(xi) = Enc(xi) where
xi ∈ G where G is a large finite cyclic group (of a prime
order) [36]. This guarantees the existence of the inverse of n.
Without loss of generality assume that #0’s in P2’s input Y
is ` (i.e., #1’s in Y is n− `). We would like to highlight that
the Hamming distance can be scalable with the knowledge of
#0’s (similarly #1’s) in P2 as follows: a malicious P1 may
use (ai, bi) = (ri + g, ri + h) for a predetermined Hamming
distance value HD = `g + (n− `)h such that g−h = 1. Then,
HD = `g + (n− `)(g − 1) = ng − n + `.
For an example, if a malicious P1 desires Hamming distance
HD to be 0 then she choose g = 1 − `n−1. Next, h= g-1=
-`n−1. Hence, P1 may use (ai, bi)=(ri+(1−`n−1), ri−`n−1)
as input. To be more concrete, the attack is given as follows:
• P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each yi is
either 0 or 1. P1 then generates random ri’s and computes
R=
n∑
i=1
ri.
• Next, instead of following the protocol, P1 computes
(ai, bi)=(ri + (1− `n−1), ri− `n−1) and publishes Ai =
Commit(ai) and Bi = Commit(bi). Note that for each i,
|bi−ai| = 1 and hence, the proofs will pass successfully.
• At the end of each COT, P2 receives either ti = ri +
(1 − `n−1) or ti = ri − `n−1. After COTs are run, P2
computes the sum
T =
n∑
i=1
ti
=
∑
i|yi=0
(
ri + (1− `n−1)
)
+
∑
i|yi=1
(
ri − `n−1
)
= `(1− `n−1) + (n− `)(−`n−1) +
n∑
i=1
ri
=
n∑
i=1
ri
= R.
Therefore, the Hamming distance dH(X,Y )=T − R will
be equal to 0. We stress that the weakness in the scheme is
destructive as we prove that a relatively insignificant informa-
tion leakage causes computation of a completely inaccurate
result. Namely, without knowledge of the real X , P1 fools P2
into outputting an incorrect Hamming distance value without
being detected. Furthermore, a malicious P1 with the prior
knowledge of ` is capable of manipulating HD as it is easy to
find g and h using above equation. This is interesting because
of the following result: The authors in [41] propose a privacy-
preserving protocol for iris-based authentication using Yao’s
garbled circuits. They show that Hamming distance between
two iris codes owning by the same person is rarely close to
0 or to n between different people. Therefore, the scalability
feature of our attack can be easily adopted to various settings.
In this part, we propose the most general case and in the next
section we give a practical attack for biometric authentication
schemes reducing the computational complexity of an attacker
from O(2n) to O(n), where n is the input length. Namely, an
attacker without any prior knowledge can authenticate herself
using only n trials instead of 2n.
B. A Special Case: Apply the Generic Attack to Biometric
Authentication Systems
In this section, we apply the proposed attack for biomet-
ric authentication systems with full success. Note that the
matching procedure for fingerprint, palm print or iris actually
measures the Hamming distance between the two bit-strings
X and Y that encode the biometric sample and template (e.g.,
[7], [42], [29]).
The attack basically uses n (instead of 2n) protocol runs to
successfully authenticate to the system, where n is the input
length. In general, for an n-bit string Y = (y1, . . . , yn), an
attacker must roughly try 2n search for X of length n to pass
the threshold value which is infeasible for large n. However,
using the proposed attack a corrupted P1 can authenticate the
system after at most n trials (because the number of 0s or 1s
in Y is between 0 ≤ ` ≤ n). More precisely, for ` = 1 to
n a corrupted P1 runs the method proposed previous section.
Because 0 ≤ ` ≤ n, the authentication will be successful with
at most n trials without any knowledge of the real input X .
C. Apply the Generic for Uniformly Distributed Inputs
This attack can also be directly applied to uniformly dis-
tributed bit strings X and Y . In this scenario the input bit-
6strings of P2 (which is generated from a biometric template)
is expected to be independent and identically distributed. That
is, there are nearly equal number of zeros and ones in an
input bit string. Below, we show that this fact easily allows an
adversary to minimize the Hamming distance and successfully
deceive a verifier:
1) P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each yi is
either 0 or 1.
2) P1 picks random ri’s and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri.
3) Instead of computing (ai, bi) = (ri + xi, ri + x¯i),
P1 computes (ai, bi) = (ri − 2−1, ri + 2−1) in order
to make the commitments Ai = CommitP1,i(ai) and
Bi = CommitP1,i(bi). The authors in [8] uses homo-
morphic encryption as the commitment mechanism. Since
those cryptosystems work in a group of prime order,
the multiplicative inverse of 2 always exists, i.e. P1 can
commit to (ai, bi) = (ri−2−1, ri+2−1). Next P1 proves
that |bi− ai| = 1 which always holds. Note that P1 does
not prove the validity of her input, i.e, she does not prove
that the xi’s are equal to either 0 or 1.
4) COTs are run and, in one half of the COTs (because of
the uniform distributed inputs), P2 receives ti=ri − 2−1
and ti = ri + 2−1 in the other half.
5) P2 computes T ←
n∑
i=1
ti. Since yi’s are equally dis-
tributed, i.e. the numbers of 0s and 1s in {y1, . . . , yn}
are equal, P2 computes T =
(∑
i
ri + 2
−1
)
+(∑
i
ri − 2−1
)
=
n∑
i=1
ri = R.
6) Using the 2nd option, K = CommitP2,i(2R + n) = A1 ·
. . . ·An ·B1 · . . . ·Bn.
7) P1 sends R and the proof that K commits to 2R + n to
P2.
8) P2 computes dH(X,Y ) = T − R = 0 and authenticates
P1.
D. Our solution for the attack
The weakness of the full scheme is due to the wrong method
used for validation of the input pairs {(ai, bi),∀i = 1, . . . , n}.
A malicious P1 can exploit this weakness as described in the
previous section. Therefore, designing cryptographic protocols
should be carefully checked against these kinds of tricks.
As a security fix, we modify the step in which P1 gen-
erates random ri values. Namely, after generating each ri,
P1 will compute and publish Ai = Commit(ri + xi), Bi =
Commit(ri +x) and Commit(ri). Moreover, P1 will send the
proof of:
((ai − ri) = 0 ∨ (bi − ri) = 0) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1
that is equivalent to
(ai + bi − 2ri = 1) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1
This statement contains one more relation than the original
proof in [8]. Although the computation cost of the protocol
is slightly increased, the validation process is now secure. To
see this, assume that (ai + bi − 2ri = 1) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1 is
true. This implies |bi− ai| = 1 and (ai + bi− 2ri = 1). Here,
there are two cases:
ai = bi + 1⇒ 2bi + 1− 2ri = 1⇒ bi = ri, ai = ri + 1
bi = ai + 1⇒ 2ai + 1− 2ri = 1⇒ ai = ri, bi = ri + 1
In Section 7 we provide the security analysis of the im-
proved scheme.
1) More Efficient Solution for Biometric Authentication:
Biometric authentication systems are designed to tolerate a
small level of errors. In general, the measure process is not
perfect in most environments and thus, instead of exact match,
a biometric system authenticates a party that matches with a
small error to prevent false negatives.
The authentication process must also have a small com-
plexity to compute the result in the fastest way. Therefore
each party must prove nothing more than the necessary and
sufficient data for validation of her input.
These motivations lead us to design a more efficient proof
that can be used in the biometric authentication systems.
Namely, after generating and publishing the commitments to
ai, bi, ri as in the previous section, P1 sends the proof of:
ai + bi − 2ri = 1.
The above relation has a smaller complexity than |bi−ai| = 1
while it still provides higher security. This input validation
method is an efficient solution for our attack in the case of
biometric authentication. Note that an adversary may input
(ai, bi) = (ri − 2−1, ri + 2−1) and pass the validation but its
Hamming distance will be n2 which is the expected value of
Hamming distance between two random inputs with length n.
E. Efficiency Enhancements
In this section, we present some improvements for the
efficiency of the protocol. First, we reduce the computational
complexity of the protocol using VOT instead of COT without
sacrificing the security. Namely, COT will not be necessary in
the case where P2 computes the final Hamming distance. Next
we will reduce the complexity of the proof for the validity of
P1’s inputs in the case of biometric authentication.
1) COT versus VOT: Verifiable OT and Committed OT
are natural combination of
(
2
1
)
-OT and commitments. Let
CommitS and CommitC be commitments by Sender and
Chooser respectively. The functionality of committed OT is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Verifiable OT is defined if the CommitC(xy) is not required
as output. We show that the basic protocol in [8] does not have
to use COT in the case that the server computes the result.
We note two aspects:
What to transfer
{
bits x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}
strings x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}k
Committed Output
{
yes→ Committed OT
no → Verifiable OT
2) Efficiency Improvement Using VOT: In this section, we
point out a computational complexity reduction. Note that
COT is run for the malicious case in [8]. COT requires the
7Sender
Private Input: x0, x1
Private Output: ⊥
Common Input:
CommitS(x0), CommitS(x1),CommitC(y)
Verifiable OT←→
Chooser
Private Input: y
Private Output: xy
Fig. 1: Verifiable Oblivious Transfer
Sender
Private Input: x0, x1
Private Output: ⊥
Common Input:
CommitS(x0), CommitS(x1),CommitC(y)
Committed OT←→
Common Output: CommitC(xy)
Chooser
Private Input: y
Private Output: xy
Fig. 2: Committed Oblivious Transfer
receiver to obtain the output together with its commitment to
this value. In the beginning of the protocol, the input of P1
is an n-bit string X = (x1, . . . , xn) and the input of P2 is
an n-bit string Y = (y1, . . . , yn). After running the protocol
there are two options:
• P1 obtains the Hamming distance dH(X,Y ) and P2
obtains nothing
• P2 obtains the Hamming distance dH(X,Y ) and P1
obtains nothing
In case P2 computes the Hamming distance, the committed
values from the output of COT will not be used. In such
case, these commitments are not necessary to be computed
and, therefore VOT will be sufficient to use. We realized this
observation after writing the COT protocol explicitly with
the overall protocol instead of using as a black box. If P1
computes the Hamming distance COT will still be necessary
to use.
6. OUR FIXED AND IMPROVED SCHEME
We have made modifications to the full scheme in [8]: we
fix the security weakness described in Section 5 and improve
the efficiency of the protocol as mentioned in Section 5. Now,
we give the corrected scheme with all details:
Inputs:
• P1 inputs an n-bit string X = (x1, . . . , xn)
• P2 inputs an n-bit string Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
Outputs:
• 1st Option: P1 obtains dH(X,Y ) and P2 obtains nothing
• 2nd Option: P2 obtains dH(X,Y ) and P1 obtains nothing
Protocol:
1) P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each of yi
is either 0 or 1.
2) P1 generates random ri’s from the plaintext space of
Commit and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri.
3) P1 commits to (ai, bi, ri) = (ri + xi, ri + xi, ri). P1
publishes Ai = Commit(ai), Bi = Commit(bi) and
Commit(ri).
4) P1 proves that (|ai−ri| = 0∨|bi−ri| = 0)∧|bi−ai| = 1.
5) For each i = 1, . . . , n, a COT is run where
• P1 acts as the sender and P2 as the receiver.
• P2’s selection bit is yi.
• P1’s input bit is (ai, bi).
• The output obtained by P2 is ti = ri + (xi ⊕ yi).
• Both parties obtain Ci = Commit(ti).
6) P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti
7) 1nd Option: Run VOT
a) P1 computes K = Commit(2R + n) = A1 · . . . · An ·
B1 · . . . ·Bn.
b) P1 sends R to P2 and proves that K commits to 2R+n.
c) P2 computes K = A1 · . . . An ·B1 · . . . ·Bn and checks
that K = Commit(2R + n).
d) If all verifications are successful, P2 outputs T −R.
2st Option: Run COT
a) P2 computes C = Commit(T ) = C1 · . . . · Cn.
b) P2 sends T to P1 and proves that C commits to T.
c) P1 computes C = C1 · . . . · Cn and checks the proof.
d) If all verifications are successful, P1 outputs T −R.
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME
A cryptographic protocol is secure if the view of an adver-
sary in a real protocol execution can be generated from the
information the adversary has (i.e., its input and output). In
this section, we proved the security of the proposed protocol
by constructing a simulator, which is given only the input
and output of the “corrupted” party, and generating a view
that is indistinguishable from the view of the adversary in a
real protocol execution [9], [10], [11], [12]. This implies that
the adversary learns no information from the real protocol
because it could generate anything from what it sees in such
an execution by itself.
Theorem 7.1. The proposed protocol, which is shown in Fig-
ure 3, is secure in the presence of static malicious adversaries.
8P1 P2
X = x1 . . . xn where xi ∈ {0, 1}, skP1 Y = y1 . . . yn, yi ∈ {0, 1}, skP2
Compute CommitP2,i(yi) ∀i = 1 . . . n ∈R Z∗q
CommitP2,i+Proofs,∀i=1...n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Pick r1, . . . , rn ∈R Z∗q
Compute R =
n∑
i=1
ri
Compute (ai, bi) = (ri + xi, ri + x¯i) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Ai = CommitP1,i(ai) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Bi = CommitP1,i(bi) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Ri = CommitP1,i(ri) ∀i = 1 . . . n
<Ai,Bi+Prove that ((ai−ri)=0 or (bi−ri)=0) and |bi−ai=1|,∀i=1...n>−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1st Option:
<VOT((Ai,Bi);CommitP2,i(yi)):∀i=1...n>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Obtain ti where ti = ri + xi ⊕ yi ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute T ←
n∑
i=1
ti
Compute K = CommitP2,i(2R + n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi Compute CommitP2,i(2R + n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi
R+Prove that K commits to (2R + n)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
dH(X,Y ) = T −R
2nd Option:
<COT((Ai,Bi);CommitP2,i(yi)):∀i=1...n>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Obtain ti and Ci = Commit(ti) where
ti = ri + xi ⊕ yi ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute T =
n∑
i=1
ti
Compute Commit(T ) =
n∏
i=1
Ci Compute C = Commit(T ) =
n∏
i=1
Ci
T+Prove that C=Commit(T )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
dH(X,Y ) = T −R
Fig. 3: Our Improved Scheme
Proof. We show that given a party is corrupted, there exists
a simulator that can produce a view to the adversary that is
statistically indistinguishable from the view in the real protocol
execution based on its private decryption share as well as
public information.
Case-1-P1 is corrupted. Let AP1 be an adversary corrupting
P1. We construct a simulator SP1 and show that the view of
the adversary AP1 in the simulation with SP1 is statistically
close to its view in a hybrid execution of the protocol with
a trusted party running the VOT (resp. COT) protocol. Since
we assume that the VOT (resp. COT) protocol is secure, we
analyze the security of the protocol in the hybrid model with
a trusted party computing the VOT (resp. COT) functionality.
Note that the simulator SP1 knows X, skP1 and dH(X,Y ).
The simulator proceeds as follows:
1) SP1 picks arbitrary Y˜ = y˜1 . . . y˜n and computes
˜CommitP2,i . SP1 can simulate the proofs since it knows
the committed input values y˜i’s and skP1 .
2) In case of VOT is run:
a) SP1 first extracts the input of RP1 from VOT function-
ality in the hybrid model, then sends the input to the
trusted party and learns the output value t˜i.
b) SP1 computes T˜ =
n∑
i=1
t˜i and computes
CommitP2,i(2R + n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi as in the real
protocol.
In case of COT is run:
a) SP1 first extracts the input of RP1 from COT func-
tionality in the hybrid model, then sends the input to
the trusted party and learns the output value t˜i and
C˜i = Commit(t˜i) ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
b) SP1 computes T˜ =
n∑
i=1
t˜i and Commit(T˜ ) =
n∏
i=1
C˜i as
in the real protocol.
c) SP1 can simulate the proof since it knows the commit-
ted input value T˜ ’s and skP1 .
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication
protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes
the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript is
consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the verifier’s
view when interacting with honest P2.
Case-2-P2 is corrupted. Let AP2 be an adversary corrupting
P2, we construct a simulator SP2 as follows. Since we assume
that the COT (resp. VOT) protocol is secure, we analyze the
security of the protocol in the hybrid model with a trusted
party computing the COT (resp. VOT) functionality. Note that
the simulator SP2 knows Y = y1 . . . yn, skP2 and dH(X,Y ).
The simulator proceeds as follows:
91) SP2 picks arbitrary X˜ = x˜1 . . . x˜n.
2) SP2 picks r˜i ∈R Z∗q and computes R˜P2 =
n∑
i=1
r˜i. Next,
SP2 computes (a˜i, b˜i) = (r˜i + x˜i, r˜i + ¯˜ix) ∀i = 1 . . . n.
SP2 computes A˜i, B˜i and R˜i as in the real protocol.
SP2 can again simulate the proofs since he knows the
committed input values and skP2 .
3) In case VOT is run:
a) SP2 first extracts the input of RP1 from VOT func-
tionality in the hybrid model and then sends the
input to the trusted party. SP2 next computes K˜ =
CommitP2,i(2R˜+n). SP2 can simulate the proof since
it knows the committed input values and skP2 .
In case COT is run:
a) SP2 first extracts the input of RP1 from COT func-
tionality in the hybrid model and then sends the input
to the trusted party and learn Ci ∀i = 1, . . . , n. SP2
computes Commit(T˜ ) =
n∏
i=1
C˜i.
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication
protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes
the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript is
consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the verifier’s
view when interacting with honest P1.
8. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF OUR FIXED PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity
of our fixed protocol and compare it with the full scheme of
Bringer et al. [8]. In our protocol, the number of invoked zero-
knowledge proofs and multiplication of ciphertexts remain
the same. However, we have improved the efficiency of the
protocol significantly by replacing n COTs with n VOTs in
the second option of the protocol where P2 computes the
final Hamming distance. In this way, we show that n number
commitments, 2n number of partial decryption and 2n number
of ZK proofs can be removed. The number of commitments
of P1 is increased from 2n to 3n in order to guarantee the
validity of P1’s inputs. This is the price that should be paid
to make the protocol secure. The complexity comparison of
the full scheme of Bringer et al. [8] and our fixed protocol is
illustrated in Figure 4.
Scheme of
Bringer et al.
Our Fixed
Scheme
P1 P2 P1 P2
Commitments 2n n 3n n
ZK proofs n
OTs n COTs
1st opt: n COTs
2nd opt: n VOTs
Multiplication
of ciphertexts
1st opt: n
2nd opt: 2n
Fig. 4: Complexity Comparison
Our analysis shows that the additional cost of the security
fix is only n number of commitments made by P1, independent
of the party which computes the final Hamming distance.
However, in the case that P2 computes the final Hamming
distance, the computational savings that can be achieved by
replacing the n COTs with n VOTs are far more larger. In
general, a COT protocol requires one more flow than a VOT
protocol in which the chooser recommits to its received value
and proves that the new commitment equals to her previous
committed input. In particular, the full scheme in [8] uses the
COT scheme of [36] where each run of a COT protocol re-
quires one commitment, two partial decryption of a ciphertext
and two zero-knowledge proofs in addition to a VOT protocol.
As a result, we avoid unnecessary use of two zero-knowledge
proofs and two partial decryptions. Consequently, we improve
the efficiency of the protocol significantly while we establish
the security of the protocol.
9. CONCLUSION
Bringer et al. [8] proposed two Hamming distance computa-
tion schemes which can be applied to biometric authentication
systems. In semi-honest setting, the basic scheme in [8] is
the most efficient up to date. However, their full scheme is
insecure in the malicious case.
In this paper, we show that the full scheme of Bringer et al.
[8] has a critical security issue. In our attack, we show that
an adversary without having any prior knowledge can make
the verifier compute an incorrect Hamming distance. In the
case of biometric authentication systems, a malicious user can
easily authenticate without any information about the honest
party. Namely, the complexity of the security of the system
is reduced from O(2n) to O(n), where n is the input length.
Moreover, we fix the protocol by placing a robust method
for input validation without adding a significant cost. We
also enhance the efficiency of their protocol significantly by
showing that Verifiable Oblivious Transfer (VOT) is sufficient
to use instead of Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) in
the second option of the full scheme. VOT reduction avoids
the unnecessary computation of one commitment, two zero-
knowledge proofs and two partial decryption of the ciphertext
for each bit of the input.
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